#F SECURE 2015 INSTALL#
#F SECURE 2015 DRIVER#
#F SECURE 2015 SOFTWARE#
#F SECURE 2015 PASSWORD#
#F SECURE 2015 DOWNLOAD#

#F SECURE 2015 SOFTWARE#

We installed the software on a test machine and were quite surprised to see that after installation our F-Secure BlackLight rootkit detector was reporting hidden files on the system. The case seemed unusual so we ordered a couple of USB sticks with fingerprint authentication. The USB stick in question has a built-in fingerprint reader. We received a report that our F-Secure DeepGuard HIPS system was warning about a USB stick software driver. Guess whatвЂ¦ you might have just installed, not one, but two different rootkit-like software on your laptop.

#F SECURE 2015 INSTALL#

It has a fingerprint reader so you install the software for that as well. You do so and while you are listening to the music, you open the USB stick package and start experimenting with your new toy. You go home and stick the CD into your laptop's CD drive. And you decide to buy a new CD from your favorite artist and you also buy a brand new cool USB stick thingy on an impulse. Hypothetical: Imagine that you visit your local mall and browse around for stuff to buy. Sony Sweden did however confirm in a public IDG story that the rootkit is indeed part of their software.Дouble Whammy! Another Sony Case (And it's Not BioShock) We still haven't received any kind of response from Sony International. If you simply extract one executable from the package and include it with malware, it will hide that malware's folder, no questions asked. We didn't want to go into the details about this in our public postings, but we suppose the cat's out of the bag now that our friends at McAfee blogged about this yesterday. However вЂ“ this new rootkit (which can still be downloaded from ) can be used by any malware author to hide any folder. So their intent was more beneficial to the consumer in this case. In the DRM case, Sony was attempting to restrict you вЂ“ the user вЂ“ from accessing the music on the CD you bought. Sony is attempting to protect the user's own data. However, it can be done.ДЄnd lastly, there seems to be a use-case: The cloaking is most likely used to protect fingerprint authentication from tampering. It's also trickier to run executables from the hidden directory than with XCP. The Microvault software does not hide processes or registry keys. The MicroVault software probably wouldn't hide malware as effectively from (some) real-time antivirus scanners.

#F SECURE 2015 DRIVER#

The fingerprint driver does not hide its folder as 'deeply' as does the XCP DRM folder. The user understands that he is installing software, it's on the included CD, and has a standard method of uninstalling that software. In a nutshell, the USB case is not as bad as the XCP DRM case. This raises the question вЂ“ while the techniques employed are similar вЂ“ is this case as bad as the Sony BMG XCP DRM case Sony's software installs a driver that creates a hidden folder using rootkit techniques. Monday's post disclosed our investigation of Sony's MicroVault USM-F fingerprint reader software. Sony's USB Rootkit vs Sony's Music Rootkit Update: The malicious IFrame has been removed from the front page and it's now safe to visit the site again. We detect all of the malicious files with our latest database update.

#F SECURE 2015 PASSWORD#

This file is a small downloader which downloads additional files that are different password stealing trojans, additional downloaders, et cetera.

#F SECURE 2015 DOWNLOAD#

Two of the URLs are now down but the third contains an obfuscated JavaScript that uses exploits to download and run a file called loader.exe. This file in turn uses three IFrames to load three other URLs. On the front page of the site a hidden IFrame has indeed been inserted and it loads a URL from another website. After all, we have already done it twiceвЂ¦Д®arlier today we saw a blog post from the good people over at Sunbelt about a compromise of Bank of India's website and so we checked it out. Just in case we would again discover a rootkit or something in Sony's products. We were also promised a direct contact point for future use. We have also provided them with our internal investigation notes on the case. We have now opened direct discussion channels with Sony Electronics and are assisting them with the investigation. And they also wanted to apologize for not responding to our earlier queries regarding the incident. They wanted to thank us for bringing the MicroVault incident to their attention.

F secure 2015